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NOTRE DAME'LAWYER
his account with the amount to be collected. The Federal court denies
the plaintiff a preference over the general creditors on the ground that
there had been no increase in the assets of the bank and to grant a
preference would be an injustice to the general creditors. However, if
the bank upon charging the account of the person from whom the collection was made, had taken that amount of money from its cash
funds and set it aside for the plaintiff it would seem hard to deny that
a trust would be created.20 Should not, then, the wrongful failure of
the bank to separate this money from its cash funds be considered as
a mixing of trust money with its own money? Can any distinction be
made between a case where a bank wrongfully receives money and
mixes it with its cash funds, and a case where a bank wrongfully fails
to separate money from its cash funds? It would seem that in both
cases the bank should be treated as having wrongfully mixed trust
money with its cash funds. No injury would be done to the general
creditors by this result. If the bank had carried out the transaction
in the proper manner it would have separated from its cash the amount
charged to the account of the depositor from whom the collection was
made. In this event the amount available to the general creditors would
be reduced by the' amount claimed by the plaintiff. Therefore, there
would seem to be no injustice to the creditors to give the plaintiff a
preference for the amount of his claim, provided the cash on hand in
the bank was, at all times from the charging of the depositor from
whom the collection was made until the closing, of the bank, equal
to or greater than the amount of the collection. If the cash on hand
should at any time fall below the amount of the collection the plaintiff should be given a preference only to the extent of the lowest amount
21
reached.
John A. Berry.

RECENT DECISION
CommoN DISASTER-PRESUMPTION OF SURVIVORSHIP-SUFFICIENCY Or PROOF.A husband and wife were found shot in their home, both having met death at
about the same time. The first officer on the scene found the husband's body
colder than that of his spouse. Award of insurance money was made to the wife's
20

See: Davis v. McNair, 48 Fed. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Schu-

macher v. Brinson, 52 Fed. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Secrest v. Organ,
112 Kan. 23, 209 Pac. 824 (1922).
21 In 82 A. L. R. 97 cases from the following jurisdictions are cited as
allowing a preference under similar facts: United States (C. C. A. 5th), Arkansas,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Cases from the following jurisdictions are
cited as contra: United States (cases from several circuits), Idaho, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota.
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estate on the ground that she had survived her husband. Held, that the award
was supported by the evidence. Clarke v. Bryson, 29 Pac. (2d) 275 (Cal. 1934).
The principal case brings to the surface many interesting problems and they
will be treated in order. Into the limelight of interest is thrust the conflict between
the civil law and the common law on the subject of presumption of survivorship
when there is a common disaster, the civil law insisting that its alluring and intriguing schemes founding presumptions on differences in age, health, sex and
physical strength, are sound public policy, and the common law countering with
its stolid but just as insistent declaration that there is no presumption of survivorship in such case when that fact is unascertainable. Throughout this discussion, it is assumed that what is meant by a common disaster is, as Bouvier
phrases it, "where several persons happen to perish together by the same event,
such as the burning of a house, a trainwreck, the sinking of a ship, a battle,
etc., without any possibility of ascertaining who died first." BouvIER, LAW DicTioNARY (Rawles' 1914 Revision) 778. The difficulty raised by these common
disasters, and the one with which the courts frequently have to cope, arises when
the persons perishing are respectively entitled to inherit from each other, as is
the situation in the case of a mutual will, or when one is the insurance beneficiary of the other, contingent upon his survivorship. It is often said that under
the civil law there is no presumption that all died simultaneously, while under
the common law there is no presumption of survivorship, and this fact, if claimed,
must be proved. Modern Woodmen of America v. Parido, 335 Ill. 239, 167 N. E.
52 (1929). In the absence of a statute, of course, the common law will prevail and
survivorship will have to be proved. As the statutes in the great majority of the
states on the matter adopt the common law, the problem in those states becomes
narrowed down to consideration of the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the
burden imposed on the party asserting survivorship. It is to be lamented, in the
humble opinion of this writer, that but two states, namely, California and
Louisiana, have seen fit to reenact the civil law in this respect, for in our age of
high speed, congested travel and living, the probability of mass calamities is increased countless fold, and courts: are frequently placed in embarrassing situations
when the proof of survivorship is unobtainable.
The principal case is especially interesting in that it arises in California, one
of the two states, as was pointed out above, which have reenacted the civil law
by statute. The California statute is instructive. It provides that when two persons perish in the same calamity and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from strength, age, and sex, and that if both be over fifteen and under
sixty years of age, the male is presumed to have survived; or if both be under the
age of fifteen years, the older is presumed to have survived; or if both be over
sixty years of age, the younger is presumed to have survived; or if one be under
fifteen and the other above sixty years of age, the former is presumed to have
survived; or if one be under fifteen, or over sixty years of age, and the other
between those ages, the latter is presumed to have survived. ConE or CIVIL PaoCEDuRE (1929) § 1963.
It should be noted that this statute goes even further than the civil law
which indulged in like presumptions only as to parents and children. DEATH,
17 C. J. 1180. It should further be commented on that the principal case did
not benefit from the presumptions set forth by the statute. There was involved
here a "particular circumstance," namely, the difference in temperature between
the bodies of the man and woman which was held sufficient to justify an inference that the man had predeceased. An examination of the cases is convincing
that the great number of common law states would not regard such proof as
sufficient to validate a finding of survivorship. For example, in a very recent
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case, the Surrogate Court of a county in New York held that where both man and
wife died in their home from illuminating gas asphyxiation, evidence tending to
show that the body of the wife was warm and that of the husband was cold
when the bodies were found, was insufficient, in the absence of proof of other
facts, to establish survivorship of the wife. In re Burza's Estate, 272 N. Y. S. 248
(1934). However, that mere difference in temperature may be enough to satisfy
the burden under some circumstances is indicated in an Ohio case in which it
was held that the inference that the wife had died first was not justified when
considered with the fact that her body was very thinly clad and that she had
lost a great amount of blood, whereas the husband had been shot but once, had
bled but little, indicating a quick death and bad been fully clothed. Evans v.
Halterman, 165 N. E. 869 (Ohio 1928). In this case, despite the fact that the
wife's body was colder, the circumstances surrounding her death rebutted any
inference that she had predeceased her husband, and in fact the court was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that she had survived,
despite the fact her body was colder. While the conclusion is entirely conjectural,
it is possible the court might have ruled otherwise if these circumstances had
not been present. However, in the great number of common law jurisdictions, as
above indicated, the mere difference in temperature would be insufficient. It is
commonly ruled that slight circumstances. as to survivorship are insufficient to
meet the burden of establishing survivorship. Hilderbrandt v. Ames, 66 S. W.
128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). Given but a slight circumstance, as the difference in
temperature of the bodies would constitute, the testimony of experts, medical
or otherwise, would have to be disregarded. For in the absence of definite facts
and circumstances, the testimony of experts is sheer speculation. In re Englebirt's
Will, 171 N. Y. S. 788 (1907). But from what has already been stated, it is observable that where there is some particular circumstance or set of facts from
which survivorship can be inferred, the aid of presumptions is unnecessary in
the common law jurisdictions as well as those applying the civil law. Although
the party asserting the fact has the burden of its proof, survivorship may be
ascertainable. This is true of the mutual killings, suicide pacts and double murders
that frequently occur, for medical testimony of the nature of the wounds, amount
of bleeding, probability of immediate or lingering death can in such cases be
given, and courts are prone to find survivorship on such evidence. Thus in In re
Martlinen's Estate, 214 N. W. 469 (Minn. 1927), evidence and medical testimony
of the above nature was held to amply justify a special verdict that the wife
had survived the husband. The party alleging survivorship must sustain his
burden by affirmatively establishing the preponderance of evidence or he will
fail, for the other party is never bound to disprove the asserting party's allegation. Evmmact, 10 R. C. L. 896. Different courts will require different degrees of
proof. For instance, in Pennsylvania, it is held that the fact of survivorship in a
common disaster may be shown by circumstances sufficient to satisfy the reasonably well-balanced mind. Baldus v. Jeremias, 145 At]. 820 (Pa. 1929). This variation of the well-known "reasonable man" doctrine is indicative of the test commonly adopted, but it is unnecessary to prompt the reader that the "reasonable
man" is a vacillating creature and will not be convinced by the same set of
facts in all jurisdictions.
It is in the more strictly designated common disaster, as the conflagration,
or the sinking of a ship, that proof of survivorship, no matter how tenuous, is
.aipossible because of the fact that it is unascertainable. To illustrate the circumstances the courts find themselves confronted with, it is but necessary that
a single case be cited. A man and wife perished in a sinking at sea and survivorship was, as is common in such cases, unascertainable. An insurance policy
stipulated that the proceeds would be payable to the other if living at the time

